## Lecture 22: Network Security COMP 332, Fall 2018 Victoria Manfredi





Acknowledgements: materials adapted from Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 7<sup>th</sup> edition: ©1996-2016, J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved as well as from slides by Abraham Matta at Boston University, and some material from Computer Networks by Tannenbaum and Wetherall.

## Today

## 1. Announcements

- hw8 due today by 11:59p, hw9 due Wed.11:59p
- office hours today from 3-5:30p, Tu from 4-5:30p
- 2. A day in the life of a web request

## 3. Network Security

- overview
- principles of cryptography

## 4. Symmetric encryption

- overview
- block ciphers
- Data Encryption Standard (DES)
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

## Back to the story of the Internet ...

## Developed to withstand external attacks

routers forward packets around link outages

#### Not internal attacks


all hosts were trusted

#### Packets were not encrypted

- anyone can look at and modify
- Solution: TLS protocol end-end encrypts packet data, detects modification

#### But, packet src and dst addresses still not encrypted


routers parse dst address to route pkt



# Summarizing Example A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A WEB REQUEST

## What really happens when you enter URL?

How does your laptop download www.google.com?



## **Connecting to Internet**

#### **Connecting laptop needs**

- its own IP addr
- IP addr of first-hop router
- IP addr of DNS server

## How? DHCP request

- encapsulated in UDP
- encapsulated in IP
- encapsulated in Ethernet
- broadcast on LAN
  - dst: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF

Router running DHCP server receives DHCP request

Ethernet demuxed to IP demuxed to UDP demuxed to DHCP

DHCP

UDP IP

Eth

Phv

DHCP

UDP

IP Eth

Phv

DHCP


2

DHCP

Router

(runs DHCP)

## **DHCP** server sends response



## DHCP server sends DHCP ACK

- contains
  - IP addr assigned to client
  - subnet block (network mask)
  - IP addr of 1<sup>st</sup>-hop router
  - name & IP addr of DNS server

#### - encapsulate

- in UDP, then IP, then Ethernet
- forward to client
  - through LAN via switch
  - (switch has learned where client is)

## Client needs IP addr of www.google.com

## How? DNS query created


- encapsulated in UDP
- encapsulated in IP
- encapsulated in Ethernet
- But Client needs MAC address of router interface
- to send Ethernet frame
- broadcasts ARP query

#### Router receives ARP query

sends ARP reply with MAC addr of router interface

## Client gets MAC addr of 1<sup>st</sup>-hop router

• can now send frame containing DNS query



## Client now needs IP addr of www.google.com

## 1. IP pkt containing DNS query

 forwarded via LAN switch from client to 1<sup>st</sup> hop router


# Image: Construction of the construc

## 2. IP pkt forwarded

 from campus network into Comcast network


## 4. DNS server replies to client

with IP addr of www.google.com




- 3. Routed to DNS server
- using tables created by e.g., OSPF and BGP

## Client opens TCP connection to carry HTTP



3. Web server responds with TCP SYNACK and client replies with TCP ACK. Connection established!

## **Client sends HTTP request and receives reply**



# Network Security OVERVIEW

## What is network security?

Goal: enable secure communication over insecure channel

#### Confidentiality

- only sender, intended receiver understand message contents
  - sender encrypts message
  - receiver decrypts message

#### Authentication

- sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other


#### Message integrity

sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection

## Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy

#### Well-known in network security world

- Alice and Bob want to communicate securely
- Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages



## **Real-life Alices and Bobs?**

Web browser and server for on-line purchases

On-line banking client and server

Email client and server

**DNS** servers

Routers exchanging routing table updates

Other examples?

## What can enemies do?

#### **Passive attack**

- sniff and record messages
- analyze traffic patterns of messages

#### Active attack

- replay and/or modify messages
- impersonate
  - spoof source addr (or any other field) in new packet
- hijack
  - take over ongoing connection
  - by removing sender or receiver, and inserting oneself in their place
- denial of service
  - prevent service from being used by others
  - e.g., by overloading resources

# Network Security PRINCIPLES OF CRYPTOGRAPHY

## Confidentiality

## How can Alice hide msg she wants to send to Bob?

– so only Bob and no-one else can read msg?


## Encryption

- used to disguise a msg and hide its contents
- plaintext: unencrypted msg
- ciphertext: encrypted msg

## **Encryption algorithm**

- substitute/rearrange pieces of plaintext with pieces of ciphertext
- known and publicly available
  - keys (secret info) used to prevent intruder from decrypting data

## The language of cryptography



## How to break an encryption scheme?

#### Cipher-text only attack

- Trudy has ciphertext she can analyze
  - brute force: search through all keys
  - statistical analysis

#### Known-plaintext attack

- Trudy has plaintext corresponding to ciphertext
  - e.g., monoalphabetic cipher, Trudy determines pairings for a,l,i,c,e,b,o,

#### Chosen-plaintext attack

- Trudy can get ciphertext for chosen plaintext


#### Q: When is an encryption scheme computationally secure?

- if cost to break cipher > value of info
- If time to break cipher > time info is useful

# Symmetric Key Cryptography OVERVIEW

## Symmetric key cryptography

Both Alice and Bob use same encryption/decryption key: K<sub>s</sub>



Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

## **Caesar cipher**

#### Take each letter of plaintext

- substitute letter that is k letters later in alphabet

plai	.ntext:	abcdefg	hijklmn	opqrstuvwxyz	2
ciphe	ertext:	defghij	klmnopq	rstuvwxyzabo	2
e.g.,	plainter cipherter				

Encryption key: k=3
 # of possible keys? 26

## A more sophisticated encryption scheme

#### Substitution cipher: substitute one thing for another

- monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext:	abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ciphertext:	mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

e.g., plaintext: bob. meet me in wonderland ciphertext: nkn. hccu hc sj rkjvcogmjv

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26 letters to set of 26 letters # of possible keys? 26!

## An even more sophisticated encryption scheme

## Polyalphabetic cipher

- use n substitution ciphers,  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n$  + cyclic pattern
  - e.g., n=4:  $M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2$ ;  $M_1, M_3, M_4, M_3, M_2$ ; ...
- for each new plaintext symbol
  - use subsequent substitution pattern in cyclic pattern
- E.G., plaintext: dog ciphertext: d from  $M_1$ o from  $M_3$ g from  $M_4$

Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern # of possible keys? (26!)<sup>n</sup>

## Back to the modern world

2 classes of symmetric key encryption techniques

## 1. Block ciphers

- process one block of elements at a time
- produce output block for each input block
- used in many secure Internet protocols
  - PGP: secure email
  - TLS/SSL: secure TCP connections
  - IPSec: secure network layer communication

2. Stream ciphers

- process input elements continuously
- produce output one element at a time as it goes along
- used for wireless LANs



# Symmetric Key Cryptography BLOCK CIPHER

## **Block cipher**

#### Process msg to encrypt in *k*-bit blocks

- k=64: msg broken into 64-bit blocks
  - each block encrypted independently
  - each *k*-bit block of plaintext mapped to *k*-bit block of ciphertext

## 2 approaches

- 1. Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode
  - 1 block of plaintext encrypts to same block of ciphertext
- 2. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
  - 1 block of plaintext can encrypt to different blocks of ciphertext

Q: which do you think is more secure?

## Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode

1 block of plaintext always encrypts to same block of ciphertext

#### Electronic Codebook, k=3

Input	Output	
000	▶ 110 ]	2 <sup>3</sup> ! choices for map.
001	111	Huge table for even just k=64, so use functions that simulate randomly permuted table
010	101	
011	100	51
100	011	
101	010	plaintext: 010 110 001 111
110	000	ciphertext: 101 000 111 001
111	001	

## **Problems with ECB**

## Trudy can start to build codebook without knowing key

- given plaintext and ciphertext for a few msgs
- bits of msgs repeat in real world
  - 2 or more blocks of plaintext may be identical
- msg to be encrypted may have regular structure, similar start/end
  - e.g., email, webpage

## Trudy can modify ciphertext without knowing key

- transfers \$100 between 2 banks several times, watches exchange
- correlates msgs that authorize transaction, replays msg

## Cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode

1 block of plaintext maps to different blocks of ciphertext

#### Assume 64 bit blocks

- m(i): i<sup>th</sup> plaintext block
- c(i): i<sup>th</sup> ciphertext block
- c(0): initialization vector (iv), random 64 bit string
- k<sub>s</sub>: symmetric key

## a $\oplus$ b: exclusive or (XOR) of 2 bit strings, a and b

- 1 if and only if 1 of bits is 1
- 0 otherwise

## **CBC** steps

- 1. Sender generates IV and sends to receiver in plaintext
- 2. Sender computes 1<sup>st</sup> block, c(1), and sends to receiver  $c(1) = k_s(m(1) \oplus c(0))$

1<sup>st</sup> ciphertext 1<sup>st</sup> plaintext initialization block block vector

3. Sender computes i<sup>th</sup> block, c(i), and sends to receiver  $c(i) = k_s(m(i) \oplus c(i-1))$ 

i<sup>th</sup> ciphertext block

- 4. Receiver decrypts c(i) to get  $m(i) \oplus c(i-1)$ 
  - knows initialization vector, c(0), does  $\oplus$  to recover original msg

Identical plaintext blocks will almost certainly map to different ciphertexts

# Symmetric Key Cryptography DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD

## **Data Encryption Standard (DES)**

#### Features

- 56-bit symmetric key, 2<sup>56</sup> possible keys
- 64-bit plaintext block input
- block cipher with CBC

#### Q: How secure is DES?


- brute force attack: 1 sec for DES
- no known good analytic attack

#### Making DES more secure

3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

## **DES operation uses Feistel cipher structure**

- Divide plaintext block in half
  L<sub>1</sub> and R<sub>1</sub>
- 2. L<sub>1</sub> and R<sub>1</sub> pass through n=16 rounds of processing
  - each round i uses
    - inputs L<sub>i-1</sub> and R<sub>i-1</sub> from previous round
    - different 48 bits of 56-bit key
- 3. Combine halves at end to produce the ciphertext block



# Symmetric Key Cryptography ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD

## Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

## Replaced DES (Nov 2001)

- DES is insecure, (3)DES is slow in software, small block size

Features

- 128, 192, or 256 bit symmetric keys, up to 2<sup>256</sup> possible keys
- 128-bit plaintext block input
- block cipher with CBC
- does not use Feistel structure

#### Q: How secure is AES?

- brute force attack
  - 1 sec for DES
  - 149 trillion years for AES