## Lecture 20: Routing again

COMP 332, Fall 2018 Victoria Manfredi





**Acknowledgements**: materials adapted from Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 7<sup>th</sup> edition: ©1996-2016, J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved as well as from slides by Abraham Matta at Boston University, and some material from Computer Networks by Tannenbaum and Wetherall.

## **Today**

#### 1. Announcements

- hw7 programming due Wednesday at11:59p
- hw8 due Thursday at 11:59p

#### 2. Internet routing

- intra-AS routing
- inter-AS routing

#### 3. Internet addressing (again)

- IPv6 addresses
- Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
- Network Address Translation (NAT)

## Internet ROUTING INTRA-AS ROUTING

## Most common intra-AS routing protocols

#### **RIP**

- Routing Information Protocol
- distance vector protocol

#### (E)IGRP

- (Enhanced) Interior Gateway Routing Protocol
- Cisco proprietary for decades, until 2016
- distance vector protocol

#### IS-IS

- Intermediate System to Intermediate System
- link state protocol

#### **OSPF**

- Open Shortest Path First
- link state protocol

## Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)

#### Open

i.e., publicly available

#### Link-state algorithm

- 1. Each router floods its link state to all other routers in AS
  - msgs carried directly over IP, authentication possible
  - supports unicast (1src –1dst) and multicast (1src multiple dst)
- 2. Each router builds topology map
- Route computation using Dijkstra's
  - can have multiple paths with same cost
    - traffic can go over different paths
  - can have different costs per link depending on type of service
    - e.g., satellite link cost: low for best effort, high for real time

# Internet ROUTING INTER-AS ROUTING


## Inter-AS routing

#### Router in AS1 receives pkt destined outside of AS1

– router forwards pkt to gateway router, but which one?

#### AS1 must learn which dsts reachable through neighbor ASes

- propagate this reachability info to all routers in AS1
- $\Rightarrow$  job of inter-AS routing!



## **Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)**

#### Defacto inter-domain routing protocol


- allows subnet to advertise its existence to rest of Internet
- path vector protocol

#### BGP provides way to find good routes to other networks

- based on reachability info and policy
- eBGP: external
  - obtain subnet reachability info (routes) from neighboring ASes
- iBGP: internal
  - propagate externally learned reachability info (routes) to all routers in AS
  - similar to intra-AS routing protocols but more scalable

Q: why must all ASes use same inter-AS protocol

### eBGP vs. iBGP connections






gateway routers run both eBGP and iBGP protocols

#### How eBGP works

#### Similarities with distance vector

- per dst route info advertised
- no global sharing of network topology
- iterative distributed convergence



#### Differences from distance vector

- selects best route based on policy not min cost
- path vector routing
  - advertises entire path for each dst rather than cost
    - allows policies based on full path
    - avoids loop: if your AS is in path then discard
  - selective route advertisements
    - choose not to advertise route to dst for policy reasons
    - aggregate routes for scalability: e.g., a.b.\*.\* and a.c.\*.\* become a.\*.\*.\*

## Policy-shaped route selection

#### Political, economic, security considerations

#### Shaped by business relationships between ASes

- AS1 is customer of AS2 (AS 1 pays AS2)
- AS1 is provider of AS 2
- AS1 is peer of AS 2 (peers don't pay each other to exchange traffic)

#### E.g.,

- don't want to carry commercial traffic on university network
- traffic to apple shouldn't transit through google
- pentagon traffic shouldn't transit through Iraq

#### Why BGP is so complicated!

## Why different intra- vs. inter-AS routing?

#### **Policy**

- inter-AS
  - admin wants control over how its traffic routed, who routes through its net
- intra-AS
  - single admin, so no policy decisions needed

#### Scale

hierarchical routing saves table size, reduced update traffic

#### Performance

- inter-AS
  - policy may dominate over performance
- intra-AS
  - · can focus on performance

## Routing blackholes



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#### Google routing blunder sent Japan's Internet dark on Friday

#### Another big BGP blunder

By Richard Chirgwin 27 Aug 2017 at 22:35

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Last Friday, someone in Google fat-thumbed a border gateway protocol (BGP) advertisement and sent Japanese Internet traffic into a black hole.

The trouble began when The Chocolate Factory "leaked" a big route table to Verizon, the result of which was traffic from Japanese giants like NTT and KDDI was sent to Google on the expectation it would be treated as transit.

Since Google doesn't provide transit services, as BGP Mon explains, that traffic either filled a link beyond its capacity, or hit an access control list, and disappeared.

The outage in Japan only lasted a couple of hours, but was so severe that Japan Times reports the country's Internal Affairs and Communications ministries want carriers to report on what went wrong.

BGP Mon dissects what went wrong here, reporting that more than 135,000 prefixes on the Google-Verizon path were announced when they shouldn't have been.



#### Security


## Evil ISPs could disrupt Bitcoin's blockchain

Boffins say BGP is a threat to the crypto-currency

By Richard Chirgwin 11 Apr 2017 at 03:03



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Attacks on Bitcoin just keep coming: ETH Zurich boffins have worked with Aviv Zohar of The Hebrew University in Israel to show off how to attack the crypto-currency via the Internet's routing infrastructure.

That's problematic for Bitcoin's developers, because they don't control the attack vector, the venerable Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that defines how packets are routed around the Internet.

BGP's problems are well-known: conceived in a simpler era, it's designed to trust the information it receives. If a careless or malicious admin in a carrier or ISP network sends incorrect BGP route information to the Internet, they can black-hole significant chunks of 'net traffic.

In this paper at arXiv, explained at this ETH Website, Zohar and his collaborators from ETH, Maria Apostolaki and Laurent Vanbever, show off two ways BGP can attack Bitcoin: a partition attack, and a delay attack.

## **BGP** hijacking

https://www.zdnet.com/article/china-has-been-hijacking-the-vital-internet-backbone-of-western-countries/

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
D JUST IN: Apple's new iPad Pro, MacBook Air, Mac mini aims to keep enterprise, SMB momentum

## China has been 'hijacking the vital internet backbone of western countries'

Chinese government turned to local ISP for intelligence gathering after it signed the Obama-Xi cyber pact in late 2015, researchers say.



By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | October 26, 2018 -- 12:39 GMT (05:39 PDT) | Topic: Security



#### MORE FROM CATALIN CIMPANU

Security

Many CMS plugins are disabling TLS certificate validation... and that's very bad

Securit

Google launches reCAPTCHA v3 that detects bad traffic without user interaction

Security

US ban's exports to Chinese DRAM maker citing national security risk

Security

Pakistani bank denies losing \$6 million in country's 'biggest cyber attack'

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# Internet Addressing IPV6 ADDRESSES

#### **IPv6** motivation

#### **Initial motivation**

- 32-bit address space soon to be completely allocated
- 128-bit IPv6 address: more than 1028x as many IPv4 address

#### Additional motivation

- header format helps speed processing/forwarding
- header changes to facilitate QoS

#### IPv6 packet format

- fixed-length 40 byte header
- no fragmentation allowed

## Ifconfig example

```
> ifconfig
lo0: flags=8049<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 16384
        options=1203<RXCSUM,TXCSUM,TXSTATUS,SW_TIMESTAMP>
        inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 0xff000000
        inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128
        inet6 fe80::1%lo0 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x1
        nd6 options=201<PERFORMNUD, DAD>
gif0: flags=8010<POINTOPOINT, MULTICAST> mtu 1280
stf0: flags=0<> mtu 1280
en0: flags=8863<UP,BROADCAST,SMART,RUNNING,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
        ether 78:4f:43:73:43:26
    inet6 fe80::1c8d:4bcb:b52d:9d1d%en0 prefixlen 64 secured scopeid 0x5
        inet 10.66.104.246 netmask 0xfffffc00 broadcast 10.66.107.255
        nd6 options=201<PERFORMNUD, DAD>
        media: autoselect
        status: active
```


## Dig www.google.com ANY

```
> dig ANY www.google.com
; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> ANY www.google.com
;; global options: +cmd
:: Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 31338
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 7, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.google.com.
                                          ANY
                                   ΙN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.google.com.
               240
                            IN
                                   A 173.194.66.147
www.google.com. 240
                            IN
                                   A 173.194.66.105
                                   A 173.194.66.104
www.google.com. 240
                            IN
www.google.com. 240
                            IN
                                   A 173.194.66.99
www.google.com.
                  240
                            IN
                                   A 173.194.66.103
                     240
www.google.com.
                            ΤN
                                       173.194.66.106
                                          2607:f8b0:400d:c01::68
www.google.com.
                                   AAAA
                     208
                            IN
;; Query time: 4 msec AAAA is an IPv6 record
;; SERVER: 129.133.52.12#53(129.133.52.12)
;; WHEN: Mon Apr 9 13:15:11 2018
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 156
```

## IPv6 deployment

#### Standardized ~1998

- 2008: IPv6 < 1% of Internet traffic</li>
- 2011: IPv6 increasingly implemented in OS, mandated by governments and cell providers for new network devices, ....
- as recently as last year, Wesleyan did not support IPv6



# Addressing DYNAMIC HOST CONFIGURATION PROTOCOL


## **DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol**

#### Goal


let host dynamically obtain IP addr from server when it joins network

#### Benefits

- reuse of addresses by different hosts
  - only hold address while connected to network
  - host can renew its lease on address in use
- support for mobile users who want to join network



#### Client-server scenario



Q: What layer is DHCP in?

Q: What transport layer protocol does DHCP run over?

140.	Time	Jource		FIO E Length				
	63 6.261619	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255					ID 0xecc8a20d
	99 6.565966	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255				<ul><li>Transaction</li></ul>	
	01 6.570664	129.133.176.5	vmanfredismbp2.wi					ID 0xecc8a20e
L 12	05 7.573840	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255					ID 0xecc8a20e
12	06 7.581751	129.133.176.6	vmanfredismbp2.wi…	DHCP 3	342 DHCP			ID 0xecc8a20e
12	08 7.597775	129.133.176.5	vmanfredismbp2.wi	DHCP 3	342 DHCP	ACK	<ul><li>Transaction</li></ul>	ID 0xecc8a20e
	120F- 242 L		26 644-1 242 6-4		2726 544	-\		
Frame 1205: 342 bytes on wire (2736 bits), 342 bytes captured (2736 bits) on interface 0								
► Ethernet II, Src: 78:4f:43:73:43:26 (78:4f:43:73:43:26). Dst: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)  Thernet Broadcast (Version # Src: 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.								
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0), Dst: 255.255.255.255.255.255.255.255.255.								
▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 68 (68), Dst Port: 67 (67)								
▼ Bootstrap Protocol (Request)  Mossage type: Boot Boguest (1)								
Message type: Boot Request (1)								
Hardware type: Ethernet (0x01)								
Hardware address length: 6								
Hops: 0								
Transaction ID: 0xecc8a20e								
Seconds elapsed: 1								
▶ Bootp flags: 0x0000 (Unicast)								
Client IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)								
Your (client) IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)								
Next server IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)								
Relay agent IP address: 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0)								
	Client MAC address: 78:4f:43:73:43:26 (78:4f:43:73:43:26)							
	Client hardware address padding: 0000000000000000000							
	Server host name not given							
	Boot file name not given							
	Magic cookie: DHCP							
	▶ Option: (53) DHCP Message Type (Request)							
	▶ Option: (55) Parameter Request List							
	▶ Option: (57) Maximum DHCP Message Size ▶ Option: (61) Client identifier							
	•							
	Option: (50) Req							
	Option: (54) DHC		ltier					
	Option: (12) Hos							
	Option: (255) En	d						
	Padding: 000000							

Pro ▲ Length

Info

No.

Time

Source


Destination

# Addressing NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION

## **Network Address Translation (NAT)**

#### **Motivation**

local network uses 1 IP address as far as outside world is concerned




Externally: all packets leaving local network have same single source NAT IP address: 138.76.29.7, different source port #s

Internally: each host gets unique address from set of private subnet addresses, 10.0.0/24

## NAT implementation on router

#### **Outgoing packets**

Replace (src IP addr, port #) to (NAT IP addr, new port #)



#### **Incoming packets**

Replace (NAT IP addr, new port #) in dst fields with corresponding (src IP addr, port #) in NAT table

Q: # of connections supported with 16-bit port #?

Q: Why was NAT was designed this way? Can ICMP traffic reach host behind NAT router?

Most traffic is TCP or UDP

## NAT pros and cons

#### Pros

- don't need range of addresses from ISP
  - just one public IP address for all devices
- change private addresses of devices
  - · without notifying outside world
- change ISP
  - without changing addresses of devices in local network
- security
  - devices inside local network not explicitly addressable or visible

#### Cons: NAT is controversial!

- routers should only process up to network layer
- address shortage should be solved by IPv6
- violates e2e argument
  - app designers (e.g., p2p) must account for NAT usage
- creates a strange kind of connection-oriented network
- NAT traversal
  - how to connect to server behind NAT? Problems for VOIP, FTP, ...

## Recall RFC 1958 architectural principles

- 1. Make sure it works: don't finalize standard before implementing
- 2. Keep it simple: Occam's razor
- Make clear choices: choose one way to do it
- 4. Exploit modularity: e.g., protocol stack
- 5. Expect heterogeneity: different hardware, links, applications
- 6. Avoid static options and parameters: better to negotiate
- Look for a good not necessarily perfect design: onus is on the designers with the outliers to work around design
- 8. Be strict when sending and tolerant when receiving
- 9. Think about scalability: no centralized databases, load evenly spread over resources
- 10. Consider performance and cost: if bad, no one will use network